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ARTICLE
‘Events dear boy, events’: terrorism and security from the perspective
of politics
Andrew W. Neal*
Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
This article asks what it would mean to consider terrorism and security from the per-
spective of politics. It argues that security politics – defined as the activity of politicians
when connected in some way to security – has been largely excluded from existing
scholarly approaches to terrorism and security. In contrast to the assumptions about
existential threat and sovereign/executive power characteristic of existing approaches,
the article argues that if we consider security in terms of what is at stake for politi-
cians, then it can no longer be considered as separate from ‘normal’ politics. From the
perspective of politics, security events are just like other politically salient events.
Keywords: terrorism; security; politics; events; securitisation
Introduction
In the 10 years of scholarship on terrorism and security since 9/11, there has been a heavy
focus from some quarters on the nature of threats and a heavy focus from others on the
critique of sovereign power and security governance. Following the nomenclature of this
journal, we might call these two strands ‘traditional’ security scholarship and ‘critical’
security scholarship, although such categories are always fuzzy and contestable. This arti-
cle argues that there is something missing from the attentions of both, and that is security
politics. By politics, I mean the activity of professional politicians (Weber 1994, Palonen
2006), rather than simply governments or political leaders, and by security politics, I mean
when this activity relates to security in some way, whether objectively, discursively or by
some other connection. My argument is that despite their differences, traditional security
scholarship and critical security scholarship perform the same classic security trope: that
security is an existential realm of sovereign or executive prerogative. The assumption is
that if we want to understand security, we need to analyse how political leaders and the
executive branch of government conceive, identify and tackle security threats. This trope
leads to the analytical exclusion of security politics.
This matters because there is a great deal of activity by politicians relating to terror-
ism and security that does not fall under the umbrella of sovereign or executive power.
For example, security policies have been contested in national parliaments; members of
legislatures have set up inquiries and committees (for example, on extraordinary rendition
(Intelligence and Security Committee 2007) or fast-track legislation (House of Lords Select
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Committee on the Constitution 2009)); and politicians have published reports (such as the
9/11 commission report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
et al. 2004)), scrutinised military and intelligence service budgets and fought elections
at least in part on national security tickets. This activity, understood as security politics,
involves backbench politicians, opposition parties and political leaders and ministers in
their capacity as politicians rather than as executive office holders.
In the aftermath of 9/11 and other spectacular acts of political violence since, terror-
ism and security scholarship has been understandably drawn to focus on executive and
governmental responses, some of which have been equally spectacular. Such responses to
perceived security emergencies do appear to adhere to the classic sovereign security trope
in the short term, with executive prerogative asserted, critical deliberation sidelined and
concerns about liberties and rights pushed aside (Medical Foundation for the Care of the
Victims of Torture et al. 2001, Chang 2002, Goldberg et al. 2002, Bamford 2004, Liberty
2004, Scheuerman 2006, Hewitt 2008). But the passing of 10 years since 9/11 has seen
this short-term logic fade and more diverse forms of politics return. Ten years has allowed a
broader range of political activities relating to security to play out, and the classic sovereign
security trope does not do them analytical justice.
The classic trope assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that security transcends ‘normal’
politics because of its existential importance. The trope ultimately derives from Hobbes
and finds repeated expression to the present day. In Hobbes there can be no industry,
arts or anything of civilised value without security, and therefore the security provided
by the sovereign must be the first freedom in any modern state (Hobbes 1996, p. 89).
Versions of this trope are reproduced in Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill
and Schmitt (for overviews, see Hussein 2003, pp. 16–22, Neocleous 2008, pp. 11–38).
It is Carl Schmitt who constructs the starkest argument for a necessary link between
sovereign security prerogative and existential threat on the basis of the inevitability of
‘the exception’: ‘a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the
like . . . It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that
is, the whole question of sovereignty’ (Schmitt 1985, p. 6). The idea of ‘the excep-
tion’ has been subject to intense legal and political debate and is beyond the scope
of this article (Fitzpatrick 2003, Huysmans 2004, 2008, Agamben 2005, Johns 2005,
Prozorov 2005, Tierney 2005, Gross and Ní Aoláin 2006, Neal 2006, 2008a, 2008b,
2010, Doty 2007), but what concerns us here is the sovereign security prerogative as
expressed repeatedly in modern Western political thought and practice. The classic trope
assumes that the existential realm of security is of such importance that normal politics
and law should give way to sovereign or executive power in order to deal with security
threats.
The analytical and political effect of this trope is the reification of sovereign or execu-
tive power as the fundamental security actor, excluding a wider analysis of security politics.
It also has the effect of separating the realm of security from ‘normal’ politics. The trope
can be performed in a variety of ways, but the effect is the same. It can be performed
philosophically, as in the work of Agamben (1998, 2005). It can be performed discursively
or sociologically in the vein of securitisation studies (Wæver 1995, Buzan et al. 1998,
Balzacq 2011). Or it can be reproduced through its critique in the name of human security
or emancipation (Booth 1991, Fierke 2007, pp. 186–205). The performance of the trope
creates an analytical blind spot regarding security politics and an incomplete picture of
the workings of security. It diverts attention from the multiple ways in which professional
politicians mobilise and organise around security issues, the ways they contest rather than
make policy, the diversity of political discourse beyond executive pronouncements and
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the shear breath of professional political activity that does not simply defer to executive
security prerogative.
Most significantly, the existential logic of the classic sovereign security trope conceals
the quite different political logics that may be at work in the activity of professional politi-
cians. The point is not to question whether security threats are really existential or not,
although this can certainly be a feature of political security debates. This would be to play
into an old debate on objective/subjective security introduced by Wolfers (1952): a con-
dition of objective security or insecurity being impossible to measure except perhaps in
hindsight and subjective security being a psychological condition measured only by its
deviation from ‘reality’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009, pp. 32–33; see, for example, Mueller
2005). The point is that existential survival of the state, nation or any other publicly
articulated referent object is not necessarily the primary stake for professional politicians
involved in the activity of security politics.
This article therefore asks what it would mean to rethink security from the perspective
of politics, rather than through the critique of sovereign, executive or governmental power.
What happens to our understanding of security if we refuse its separation from ‘normal’
politics? What happens if instead of beginning with the problem of existential threat (its
identification, declaration, contestation and apprehension), we consider security politics in
terms of the stakes involved for politicians? This move potentially undermines the reifica-
tion of sovereign power performed by terrorism and security studies, critical or otherwise.
The article will argue that understanding security from the perspective of politics means
that what is at stake is not existential survival but political survival. This has very different
implications for security analysis.
The first part of the article makes some further qualifications about the meaning of
security politics and considers its exclusion from scholarship in more depth. The second
part critiques securitisation theory as a sophisticated example of this exclusion. And the
final part proposes an alternative theoretical framing for understanding security from the
perspective of politics.
Security politics and its exclusion
A few qualifications are necessary first. By ‘security politics’ I do not mean the wider cri-
tique of what is political about security. Security practices, security policies and security
discourses are all political in the sense that they implicate power relations and can be cri-
tiqued and politicised as such. The potential scope of what is political about the problem
of security is ever expanding thanks to a broad range of critical scholarship, from fem-
inist approaches that unpack the gendered power relations of security practices (Hansen
2000, Richter-Montpetit 2007) to analyses of proliferating techniques of security gover-
nance such as risk management, insurance, bordering and surveillance (Vaughan-Williams
2007, Amoore and de Goede 2008, Salter 2008a, Basaran 2010, Lobo-Guerrero 2011). Jef
Huysmans argues that such contest over the political meaning of security calls into ques-
tion not only the identification of security threats but also the nature and limits of political
community itself. For example, contest over the relationship between executive security
prerogative and judicial application of human rights laws brings into question the proper
relationship between the different branches of government (Huysmans 2006, pp. 11–12).
The question of ‘the political’ is therefore an expansive one, expressed succinctly by the
political scientist Colin Hay as follows: ‘the political should be defined in such a way as to
encompass the entire sphere of the social . . . All events, process and practices which occur
within the social sphere have the potential to be political’ (2002, p. 3).
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In contrast to this expansive notion of ‘the political’, in this article I mean security
politics in a narrow sense: the activity of politics as practised by politicians. I mean the
kind of political activity examined by Max Weber in ‘The Profession and Vocation of
Politics’, which considered the modern conditions under which the political activity of
professional politicians takes place (Weber 1994). It is not my intention to privilege this
notion of politics over any other, but rather to draw attention to its neglect in terrorism and
security scholarship. The classic security trope does not capture the diverse ways in which
politicians are called to engage with terrorism and security. Existing assumptions do not
capture the full extent of the activity of security politics.
My grounds for problematising security politics stem from my ongoing empirical
research on counterterrorist lawmaking in the British parliament (see Neal 2012a). This
focuses on the arguments, practices and tactics of the full range of parliamentarians at dif-
ferent times, not only in the wake of perceived security emergencies but also when there
is no perceived emergency and when such perceptions are fading into the political back-
ground. My core claim, based on an analysis of these unexpectedly diverse parliamentary
discourses and activities, is that a whole sweep of political actors, namely politicians, have
been excluded from the analysis of security because of an overwhelming focus on the
executive branch of government, broadly understood. This analytical neglect of politicians
not only is true of traditional strategic studies and international relations (IR) approaches
in their state centrism and focus on executive decision makers (e.g. Waltz 1979, Vasquez
1993, p. 105) but is also true of much of critical terrorism and security studies in its critique
of sovereign power, its deconstruction of government security policies and its empirical
mapping of techniques of government. All these areas of analysis can be filed under the
broad category of executive power, even when that power is devolved to bureaucracies,
technical operatives or arms-length agencies (see Bigo 2002, Butler 2004, Amoore 2009).
Politicians have been marginally included as ‘domestic factors’ in some approaches, for
example, in foreign policy analysis (Hudson 2007, pp. 125–142). Politicians could also be
considered through securitisation theory as a kind of ‘audience’ for executive security dis-
courses (to which we will return), but almost no terrorism or security analysis has placed
politicians and the activity and practice of security politics at its centre. To foreground
security politics would mean considering not simply the leaders, ministers and govern-
ments whose statements and policies are often the focus of security analysis, but rather the
whole range of politicians who are members of political institutions, such as legislatures
in sovereign states and others such as those of the EU. There are strong empirical grounds
to argue that security does not simply involve the decisions of sovereigns or expansive
techniques of government, but mobilises and engages politicians in diverse ways.
The analytical neglect of security politics is largely due to the structure and evolution of
academic disciplines. Terrorism and security studies developed as an extension of the disci-
pline of IR and as such excludes the political activities of politicians, other than statesmen,
leaders and key ministers, leaving this to the discipline of political science. But at the same
time, political science has been happy to leave the analysis of security to security studies
and IR, and when it has considered questions of security it has simply performed the clas-
sic sovereign security trope. The outcome is that a proper consideration of security politics
has been excluded from both disciplines. But furthermore, beyond academic scholarship,
politicians themselves defer heavily to the executive in the aftermath of spectacular acts of
political violence, marginalising their own political activity and any reflexive consideration
of the relationship between politics and security. Security politics is therefore subject to a
triple exclusion: first, by terrorism and security studies as a sub-discipline of IR; second,
by the discipline of political science; and third, by politicians themselves in their at times
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uncritical reinforcement of sovereign or executive security prerogative. Let us unpack the
three aspects of this exclusion a little more.
The identity of any academic discipline is constituted by what it includes and excludes.
Buzan and Hansen argue that the boundaries of what they tellingly call ‘international secu-
rity studies’ (ISS) [emphasis added] have changed over time and have never been clearly
defined. Sometimes its exclusions have been successfully challenged. As they argue:
ISS . . . does not have clearly defined borders. Instead it has ‘frontier zones’ where its debates
blend into adjacent subjects, ranging from IR theory to IPE, to foreign policy analysis and
Political Theory. (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 18)
In writing a history of ISS, Buzan and Hansen admit that they necessarily reproduce the
history of its exclusions (2010, p. 661). However, it is notable that ‘politics’ is not included
in the boundary subjects they list, suggesting that it has not even been registered by the
discipline as excluded. This is not to suggest that security studies and its frontier zones
are not political or consider no political questions, but rather that the activity of security
politics as practised by politicians is missing.
Political science as a scholarly discipline, or more narrowly the academic study of the
activity of politics, remains rather insulated from security studies, and vice versa. There has
been little communication between them. Few security scholars will have engaged with the
works of Philip Norton or Bernard Crick, who represent disciplinary staples in the study
of politics, particularly of British parliamentary politics. When the discipline of ‘politics’
does engage with questions of security, it largely reproduces the classic sovereign security
trope. For example, Bernard Crick, in the British classic ‘In Defence of Politics’, argues
that in a ‘state of emergency’ open, free and consultative politics must be brushed aside
in favour of ‘the [sovereign] capacity to act without compromise or normal consultation’
(Crick 1982, p. 27).
Beyond scholarly disciplines, my empirical research on counterterrorist lawmaking
shows that politicians themselves perform and reproduce the classic security trope when
they adhere to the constitutional convention of legislative consensus and deference to the
executive at times of perceived emergency (Neal 2012a, 2012b). Politicians defer to, and
therefore recognise and legitimise, the security prerogative of the sovereign. This means
that at times of perceived emergency, there is a lack of open reflection by politicians on
their own engagement in the activity and practice of security politics. From a different
scholarly perspective, there is quantitative evidence that a post-attack ‘rally round the flag
effect’ is a common phenomenon in Western democracies (Chowanietz 2011). However,
this emergency political reaction does not encompass the whole of security politics, as the
playing out of time beyond the aftermath of the ‘emergency’ reveals. When there is no
perceived emergency, or when it is fading into the background, security politics becomes
more critical, deliberative and reflexive.
The fundamental question implied by this exclusion is whether security politics is
different or separate from ‘normal’ politics. Both the disciplines of politics and security
studies/IR have perpetuated the separation of security from politics by reproducing the
classic sovereign security trope. Security becomes a matter for the executive, not for politi-
cians in general. For security studies/IR, the politics of politicians is of marginal concern
compared with executive practices and the decisions of statesmen. For the discipline of pol-
itics, security begins where politics stops. This separation of security from the activity of
politics is true of even the most sophisticated critical approaches to security, one of which
we will look at now.
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The separation of security from politics and the example of securitisation theory
Securitisation theory has been a growth area in security studies for the past two decades
and has probably come closest to considering the role of politicians in the problem and
practice of security. Yet at its core it is built on a separation of security from politics: the
act of securitisation is conceived as the discursive movement of issues from the ‘normal’
sphere of politics to the ‘exceptional’ sphere of security by security elites (Buzan et al.
1998, p. 23). Securitisation is defined by urgency, crisis and exceptionality and thus set
apart from mere politics (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23).
The theory has formed the basis of a successful research programme for studying
how issues and events get constructed and framed as security threats. Securitisation-
based approaches analyse the statements of elites in terms of three things: first, security
discourse/language (the grammar of security); second, institutional, historical and empiri-
cal context; and third, the ‘audience’ of securitising moves. This frame of analysis can be
mapped quite neatly onto the field of politics as practised by politicians, but it is insuf-
ficient for understanding the empirical variety of political activity connected to security
issues. The notion of discursive action that the theory is built upon is merely a sophisti-
cated version of the classic sovereign security trope. The following criticisms all relate to
the construction of the theory around sovereign security prerogative and its role in moving
issues from the sphere of ‘normal politics’ to a rarefied realm of existential security, thus
reproducing their separation.
First, as I and others have argued elsewhere, securitisation theory is elite led, and this in
itself reproduces the classic sovereign security trope (Williams 2003, Neal 2010). The elite-
led assumption is based, perhaps quite reasonably, on the empirical claim that it is usually
the state or state elites who securitise (Wæver 1995, p. 51). However, this move is not
simply an innocent reflection of the way security works, but a reproduction of a particular
understanding of security that separates it from politics. It is true that securitisation theory
does not consider speech acts to occur in a vacuum of pure decisionist freedom, but in a
historical, discursive, institutional and material context. The theory conceptualises this as
the ‘felicity conditions’ which affect the chances of success of a securitising speech act
(Wæver 2000, pp. 252–253). These conditions can include the social capital of speakers,
the institutionalisation of security responses, commensurability with existing discourses
(such as racial fears and prejudices) and the presence of objective material conditions such
as troops massing on the border or images of physical destruction. Nevertheless, the elite-
led understanding of securitisation, even if contextualised, does not fully encompass the
activity of politics and the diverse ways that it can be connected to security.
Second, securitisation and security politics are not synonymous. Securitisation is the
discursive construction of security threats. This does happen of course, but it is one political
phenomenon among many possible in security politics. Even if we accept the premise that
all security problems are ultimately constructed, the problem is that this is too narrow an
analytical lens for the study of political activity relating to security. Studying the activity of
security politics does not require a formal definition of security, but rather a willingness to
be analytically led by empirical political connections to security issues of all kinds, whether
objective, subjective or discursive.
It is easy to think of examples of political activity that reference security but do not
neatly fit the securitisation model. For example, parliamentary discussion of new evidence
about the complicity in torture by the British security services is not a case of securitisation
because it does not primarily involve the construction of a security threat. Individual speak-
ers in such a debate may indeed attempt to construct ‘the security threat’ in a certain way,
but framing analysis around this and its contestation will not analytically capture the full
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scope and diversity of such political activity.1 A parliamentary report hearing over a failed
IT contract to build an ‘E-borders’ system is not a case of securitisation because the par-
ticipants will be focused on ministerial decisions and allocation of budgets and contractual
terms, even if, again, such a debate may feature specific attempts to characterise security
threats (Home Affairs Committee 2011). Making the scrapping of ID cards a manifesto
commitment is not a case of securitisation, or even for that matter desecuritisation, because
although the debate about ID cards did involve discussion of their use to counter security
threats (as well as a whole menu of other uses), this alone did not encompass the entirety of
ID cards as a political issue (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008, The Conservative Party 2010).
Third, politicians cannot be reduced to the ‘audience’ of elite securitising moves.
To reduce politicians to ‘audience’ would be to assume that politicians are mostly reac-
tive in their political activity, responding to the securitising moves of leaders or ministers.
Although this purely reactive modality does appear to exist during periods of political
consensus following spectacular acts of political violence, it is certainly not always the
case, as I have suggested above. More sociological developments of securitisation theory
have tackled the ‘audience’ problem by stressing the iterative possibilities of security dis-
course, whereby security claims can be modified in the discursive interplay between groups
(Stritzel 2007, p. 371, Salter 2008b, p. 321).
These sociological variants of securitisation theory have done much to reduce its elite-
led basis and thus offer a potential way out of its reproduction of the classic sovereign
security trope. For example, Thierry Balzacq offers a sophisticated rethinking of the
theory, arguing that analysis of securitisation should focus on the degree of congru-
ence between statements, discursive/institutional contexts and material events themselves
(2011, pp. 6–14). Balzacq loosens many of the quite restrictive formal conditions of the
original Copenhagen School conception of the theory. For example, in their 1998 Security:
a new framework for analysis, Buzan et al. (1998) are quite explicit that securitisation
means an ‘issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and jus-
tifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (p. 23). Balzacq offers a
lengthy redefinition of securitisation that I will not reproduce in full here. In place of speech
acts it stresses a wide array of ‘contextually mobilized . . . heuristic artefacts’ such as
metaphors, images, emotions and intuitions; in place of ‘existential threat’ it stresses ‘crit-
ical vulnerability’; and in place of ‘emergency measures’ it stresses a ‘customized policy
. . . undertaken immediately’ (Balzacq 2011, p. 3). Balzacq’s reformulation is promising
and takes securitisation theory quite far from its original conception, making it easier to
fit the label ‘securitization’ to a wider variety of security-implicated situations. Even in
this guise, however, the approach does not foreground the question of security politics, but
rather includes it, along with potentially everything else, in the ever-expanding variables
of ‘context’. Moreover, it maintains the separation between the realm of security, even as
expanded through broadened criteria, and the realm of ‘normal’ politics.
Even with a reduced emphasis on elite prerogative and existential threat, all forms
of securitisation theory assume that security has a specific logic that makes it, at the
very least, a special and distinct form of political activity. It takes security discourses,
broadly conceived, at face value and treats them as signs of the logic of securitisation.
This ‘specialness’ of security suggests that securitisation theory remains an extension of
the disciplinary logic that constitutes security studies and IR as separate from political sci-
ence. In this sense, securitisation remains an expression of the classic sovereign security
trope. The defining, constitutive, organising stake in this logic is the construction of an
existential threat (or critical vulnerability) to a referent object such as the state, society
or environment and its connection to certain privileged actors and means of redress. And
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although the innovation of securitisation theory is that ‘existential threat’ may be a discur-
sive construction rather than an objective condition, it still assumes that the construction of
existential threat is the central stake and that the prime mover is some form of nominalist
security prerogative under certain conditions. However, if we were to understand terrorism
and security from the perspective of the activity of politics, rather than on the basis of this
classic sovereign security trope, the logic and stakes would look rather different.
Security from the perspective of politics
Although politicians may indeed perceive or construct security threats as an existential
threat to some referent object or other, this is not necessarily their primary motivation and
not necessarily what is at stake for them politically. We should not take their claims at
face value for there may be a different political logic at work. From the perspective of
professional politics, we might consider that the biggest ‘existential threat’ for politicians
is not to a publicly cited referent object, but to the electoral life of a government or their
own political careers. This is quite different.
Securitisation analysis, which focuses on the public articulation of security discourses
and their reception and acceptance by particular audiences, cannot easily incorporate this
logic. Politicians could not in all seriousness publicly invoke the political life of a govern-
ment or their own political career as the referent object of securitisation. Although soci-
ologically we can say that politicians often invoke and modulate discourses of existential
threat, foregrounding this distracts from what is at stake in security politics, and indeed in
politics generally. This hidden stake in security politics, existing behind publicly articulated
discourses of security threat, makes security politics a ‘double game’, as conceptualised by
Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu argues that apparent concern for the interests of the politically
represented public often ‘conceals the relation of competition between the representatives’
(Bourdieu 1992, p. 183). For politicians, terrorism and security may well be urgent prob-
lems to be solved, constructed or not, but the conventions of cross-party consensus and
deference to the executive involved may conceal partisan political strategies and forms of
opportunism. Political parties are, after all, struggling to win elections and secure control
of government, but perhaps dare not speak this openly on the sensitive issue of terrorism.
My argument is that the fear and threat that drive politicians and governments may not
be existential but political. The survival at stake for politicians is not existential survival
but political survival. This is because security events and the way they are handled or
mishandled, regardless of whether constructed or not, can make or break a government.
In fact this is true of all events. Rethinking security as a problem of politically important
events, rather than in terms of sovereign or elite prerogative over existential threats, puts
quite a different complexion on how we understand security politics.
In order to consider terrorism and security from the perspective of politics and to reflect
what is at stake for politicians, we need a shift of ontology. What we need is a Machiavellian
ontology, not a Hobbesian/Schmittian one as assumed by the classic sovereign security
trope. This is a theoretical distinction I have previously made elsewhere (Neal 2010, p. 73),
but one I would like to extend here. The key distinction is that in the statist ontology of
Hobbes and Schmitt, the survival of the state, and thus the survival of the people within the
state, is what is at stake. In Machiavelli the reign of the Prince is at stake, which is not the
same thing. The reign of the Prince is akin to the reign of a government, not the survival of
a state, people or indeed other referent object.
Under a Hobbesian/Schmittian ontology the state is sovereign. The state is not just
politically sovereign, but ontologically sovereign. There are no higher forces at work than
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the state, other than the necessities for state survival that the ontology implies. Although
states can, with some difficulty, be destroyed, the ideal form of the state for Hobbes and
Schmitt is a state in sovereign command of its fate. In this sense, the sovereign state is a
mortal God. It decides what is a threat, decides what needs to be done about it and does
it. In contrast, Machiavelli’s Prince is not a mortal God. He remains subordinate to the
superior forces of fortuna or fate (Machiavelli 1999, p. 84). The Prince may build defences
against the vicissitudes of fortuna and learn historical lessons of how to perpetuate his
reign, but fortunawill always win in the end. The Prince cannot master contingency forever
and he cannot always be in command of the meaning of events. A Machiavellian ontology
is the one we should apply to security politics.
The point is that the eventual failure of the Prince’s reign is part of the rules of the
game. This is very different to the existential security trope in which ‘failure is not an
option’. It is not that the Prince can fail and the state (or securitising elites) cannot, but that
the stakes and rules of the game are different. Governments will fall as a matter of course.
But in stable liberal democracies at least, this is not an existential catastrophe. Governments
accept this as part of the rules of the game, as must the Prince. Politicians, including those
out of power, know the rules, must play by them if they want to be successful and consider
the game worth playing (Bourdieu 1992, p. 180). In the meantime governments must build
their political defences and try to hold on to power. Governments always try to plan and
control their programme in government, to stick to their policies, to not tilt. But they cannot
anticipate what fortuna may throw at them, and this is not a problem of existential threat,
but of unforeseen, politically significant events. As Harold Macmillan is reported to have
said (possibly apocryphally), the things primeministers fear the most, the things most likely
to blow a government off course, are events dear boy, events. This captures the political
stakes of security politics, and indeed all politics, rather well.
In a book on the discipline of politics, the political scientist Jean Blondel opens with a
remarkably Machiavellian account of the role of events in politics. His argument is that in
politics, enormous changes can occur because of knife-edge results, unforeseen events and
accidents and scandals that take on a life of their own. For example, governments can fall on
votes of no confidence by a margin of one because an MP happens to be ill and absent. This
is what happened to Prime Minister James Callaghan in March 1979 (Blondel 1981, p. 1).
Similarly, winner-takes-all elections that are too close to call can unprecedentedly swing on
the decisions of Supreme Court judges, as with Bush and Gore in 2000. Governments can
misinterpret and misjudge their ability to handle unforeseen events, as with the fall of the
Spanish Aznar government in the wake of the Madrid bombings. Luck and an unknown
number of unforeseen circumstances outside of individual or party control can make or
break political careers, and Blondel suggests this is more so in politics than in any other
walk of life. The unexpected death or resignation of a colleague can open up a space for
a new leader or minister; a scandal blowing up out of nowhere can discredit an opponent;
and bad weather affecting voter turnout can affect the result of an election (Blondel 1981,
p. 6).
Politics is peculiar . . . in that straightforward ‘accidents’ uncannily erupt on the political
scene. Accidents are those non-political or tenuously political events which come to have a
sharp political impact. A natural calamity, such as an earthquake or landslide, the illness or the
death of a leader may produce major ripples. Human error, a rail or ship disaster, for instance,
may surge on the political scene. Thus the ‘normal’ course of affairs may be upset because an
event, which leaders could not predict or avoid – or could avoid only at considerable financial
cost – largely because it had no political significance, creates a new situation which upsets
calculations and modifies the equilibrium of forces. (Blondel 1981, p. 7)
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Now, this is not to say that the meaning of political events is objectively contained in the
events themselves – precisely the contrary. There is no inherent political meaning in a
sudden death or a rail disaster. The problem is not simply that events are unforeseen, but
their political significance is unpredictable. The question is whether or not governments
and politicians can steer a safe path through events; whether they can remain in command
of the situation and make the most of a good crisis; or whether, like Callaghan, they come
to appear ‘no longer able to dominate events’ (Blondel 1981, p. 4).
Neither is this to say that events are random. Events have causes, but those causes
may remain unknown, unseen and multiple. And as Blondel argues, with the passing of
time, events can be seen in perspective and perhaps as part of an inevitable trend (Blondel
1981, pp. 7–8). Callaghan would have fallen sooner or later. And the impact of events
may not be as great as initially thought: ‘It is rare for the whole political system, or
even governmental policies to be markedly altered in view of an “accident”’ (Blondel
1981, p. 7). But trends lead to outcomes, and while trends can be examined, mapped and
modelled, ‘the process in which a trend is converted into an outcome’ is more mysteri-
ous: ‘it is one outcome or another which occurs in politics, not a trend . . . by its very
nature, the analysis of trends cannot lead to a precise prediction’ (Blondel 1981, p. 13)
[his italics].
This understanding of events does not fit the trope offered to us by terrorism and secu-
rity studies. Unlike traditional strategic studies with its emphasis on states and the use of
military force, there is no cold hard meaning contained in any particular event (Buzan and
Hansen 2009, p. 83). But unlike in securitisation theory, actors do not construct the mean-
ing of events either, try as they might. The events that take on the most dramatic political
significance seem to come from nowhere to exceed the predictive, preparatory and prophy-
lactic capabilities of politicians. And even when events seem part of an analysable trend,
the outcomes of those trends are fundamentally uncertain and can flip on the tiniest of mar-
gins. Certainly, governments’ successful or unsuccessful attempts to ‘spin’ the meaning of
events may have a large bearing on whether they are able to appear to remain in command,
but under this alternative ontology the meaning and construction of events is not dominated
by political elites. It is not their prerogative. Rather, events appear to take on a life of their
own.
Adopting a Machiavellian political ontology based on the priority of events and the
inevitable but non-catastrophic fall of governments gives an interesting complexion to the
question of security politics. From this perspective, there is no difference between security
events and other events. The question is not which unforeseen, contingent events will prove
to be exceptional, existential security threats (the Schmittian formulation), but rather which
events will be politically significant. This is equally unknown and contingent, but it is
defined not by existential threat, but by its impact on the life of a government or the career
of a politician. From the perspective of political survival, there is no difference between a
terrorist attack, an economic crisis or a political scandal. Of course, there may be different
ways of dealing with them politically and governmentally, but the political stakes are the
same.
If there is no political distinction between security events and other events, then this
dissolves the problematic separation of politics and security discussed earlier. Security is
not defined by its separation from normal politics, as in the Copenhagen School mould.
If we rethink the stakes as political and not existential, then this challenges the primacy of
the classic sovereign security trope. From the perspective of politics and what is at stake for
politicians, security politics is no different to politics in general. A Machiavellian ontology
reflects this different tradition regarding the role of events in politics.
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Conclusions
On the basis of the argument presented here, one should be prompted to stop and think hard
before adopting the naturalised disciplinary assumptions that seem to accompany existing
analyses of terrorism and security. This article is thus intended as a way of rethinking
the exclusions of scholarly approaches to terrorism and security. While this scholarship is
broad and diverse, it seems to suffer from certain preoccupations to the exclusion of others;
at stake is either the nature of threats or the nature of the sovereign, executive or govern-
mental power that defines and handles threats. This trope suffers from four problems: first,
it risks taking security discourses at face value when there might be other logics at work;
second, it does not encompass the empirical breadth of politics as it relates to security;
third, it risks reifying a certain understanding of political power at the expense of a more
plural understanding of politics; and fourth, it risks allowing a particular object – which I
have called the classic sovereign security trope – to define the discipline itself. These points
raise a further question: to what extent do terrorism and security studies require security to
be ‘special’ in order to justify their own importance?
We can consider this problem by turning to Michel Foucault. In The Archaeology of
Knowledge, Foucault rejects the idea that discourses are constituted by a common object
(Foucault 2002, pp. 35–36). This means, for example, that just because there is a large
discourse about madness, this does not mean that madness is a single unified thing. Rather,
madness is understood so differently from the perspective of different times and positions
in the discourse on madness that it makes no sense to consider it as an objective thing
(Foucault 2006). This is why he later said that his method consisted in saying
Let’s suppose that madness does not exist. If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can
history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organised around
something that is supposed to be madness? (Foucault 2008, pp. 20–21)
To translate this to the problem of security, we can ask whether terrorism and security
studies are constituted by the assumption of a common object: the classic sovereign security
trope. However, this article has shown that from a different perspective – that of politics
as an activity – this object looks different to the extent that it is not the same thing. If we
rethink security in terms of politically salient events as suggested here, security loses its
specialness as an object. This is a way of asking ‘what if security does not exist?’ Thus,
in answer to my initial question, this is what it would mean to rethink security from the
perspective of politics.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for comments on the article by Philippe Bonditti, Victoria Loughlan, Richard Jackson,
my colleagues in the IR Research Group at the University of Edinburgh and the two anonymous
reviewers for CST.
Note
1. Hansard HC vol 505, cols 914–926 (10 February 2010), David Miliband.
Notes on contributor
Andrew W. Neal is a lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.
He is the author of Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the
War on Terror (Routledge 2010) and co-editor (with Michael Dillon) of Foucault on Politics, Security
and War (Palgrave 2008).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
, [
An
dr
ew
 N
ea
l] 
at 
09
:14
 13
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
118 A.W. Neal
References
Agamben, G., 1998. Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life. Translated by D. Heller-Roazen.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Agamben, G., 2005. State of exception. Translated by K. Attell. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Amoore, L., 2009. On forgetting the war on terror. In: A.C. Stephens and N. Vaughan-Williams, eds.
Terrorism and the politics of response. Abingdon: Routledge, 130–143.
Amoore, L. and de Goede, M., 2008. Risk and the war on terror. London: Routledge.
Balzacq, T., 2011. Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve, PRIO new
security studies. Abingdon: Routledge.
Bamford, B., 2004. The United Kingdom’s ‘war against terrorism’. Terrorism and Political Violence,
16 (4), 737–756.
Basaran, T., 2010. Security, law and borders. London: Routledge.
Bigo, D., 2002. Security and immigration, toward a critique of the governmentality of unease.
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27 (1), 63–92.
Blondel, J., 1981. The discipline of politics. London: Butterworths.
Booth, K., 1991. Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies, 17 (4), 313–326.
Bourdieu, P., 1992. Political representation: elements for a theory of the political field. In: J.B.
Thompson, ed. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity, 171–202.
Butler, J., 2004. Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence. London: Verso.
Buzan, B. and Hansen, L., 2009. The evolution of international security studies. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, B. and Hansen, L., 2010. Beyond the evolution of international security studies? Security
Dialogue, 41 (6), 659–667.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., and Wilde, J.D., 1998. Security: a new framework for analysis. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner.
Chang, N., 2002. The silencing of political dissent. London: Turnaround.
Chowanietz, C., 2011. Rallying around the flag or railing against the government? Political parties’
reactions to terrorist acts. Party Politics, 17 (5), 673–698.
The Conservative Party, 2010. Invitation to join the Government of Britain: the conservative
manifesto 2010. London: Conservative Research Department.
Crick, B., 1982. In defence of politics. 2nd Pelican ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Doty, R.L., 2007. States of exception on the Mexico-US border: security, ‘decisions,’ and civilian
border patrols. International Political Sociology, 1 (2), 113–137.
Fierke, K.M., 2007. Critical approaches to international security. London: Polity.
Fitzpatrick, J., 2003. Speaking law to power: the war against terrorism and human rights. European
Journal of International Law, 14 (2), 241–264.
Foucault, M., 2002. The archaeology of knowledge. Trans. A.M.S. Smith. London: Routledge.
Foucault, M., 2006. History of madness. Trans. J. Murphy and J. Khlafa. Abingdon: Routledge.
Foucault, M., 2008. The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the college de France, 1978–1979. Ed.
A. Davidson and trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goldberg, D., Goldberg, V., and Greenwald, R., 2002. It’s a free country: personal freedom in
America after September 11. New York: RDV Books.
Gross, O. and Ní Aoláin, F., 2006. Law in times of crisis: emergency powers in theory and practice.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hansen, L., 2000. The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of gen-
der in the Copenhagen School. Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 29 (2),
285–306.
Hay, C., 2002. Political analysis: a critical introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hewitt, S., 2008. The British war on terror: terrorism and counter-terrorism on the home front since
9/11. London: Continuum.
Hobbes, T., 1996. Leviathan. Ed. R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Home Affairs Committee, 2011. Oral evidence taken before the Home Affairs Committee:
UK border agency enforcement, 5 April [online]. Available from: http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/uc929-i/uc92901.htm [Accessed 16 December
2011].
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2009. Fast-track legislation: constitutional
implications and safeguards. London: The Stationery Office Limited.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
, [
An
dr
ew
 N
ea
l] 
at 
09
:14
 13
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
Critical Studies on Terrorism 119
Hudson, V.M., 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Hussein, N., 2003. The jurisprudence of emergency. East Lansing: The University of Michigan Press.
Huysmans, J., 2004. Minding exceptions. Politics of insecurity and liberal democracy. Contemporary
Political Theory, 3 (3), 321–341.
Huysmans, J., 2006. The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU . London:
Routledge.
Huysmans, J., 2008. The jargon of exception – on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political
society. International Political Sociology, 2, 165–183.
Huysmans, J. and Buonfino, A., 2008. Politics of exception and unease: immigration, asylum and
terrorism in parliamentary debates in the UK. Political Studies, 56 (4), 766–788.
Intelligence and Security Committee, 2007. Rendition. London: The Stationery Office.
Johns, F., 2005. Guantanamo Bay and the annihilation of the exception. European Journal of
International Law, 16 (4), 613–635.
Liberty, 2004. The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British Muslim population. London:
Liberty.
Lobo-Guerrero, L., 2011. Insuring security: biopolitics, security and risk. Abingdon: Routledge.
Machiavelli, N., 1999. The prince. Translated by G.A. Bull. London: Penguin.
Medical Foundation for the Care of the Victims of Torture, The Law Society, Immigration
Law Practitioners Association, Refugee Legal Centre, and Liberty, 2001. Joint Statement –
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill.
Mueller, J., 2005. Simplicity and spook: terrorism and the dynamics of threat exaggeration.
International Studies Perspectives, 6 (2), 208–234.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Kean, T.H., and Hamilton, L.,
2004. The 9/11 commission report: final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks
upon the United States.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Neal, A.W., 2006. Foucault in Guantanamo: towards an archaeology of the exception. Security
Dialogue, 37 (1), 31–46.
Neal, A.W., 2008a. Exceptionalism: theoretical and empirical complexities. International Political
Sociology, 2 (1), 87–89.
Neal, A.W., 2008b. Foucault and Butler on discourses of war, law and exceptionalism. In: M. Dillon
and A.W. Neal, eds. Foucault on politics, security and war. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. 43–64.
Neal, A.W., 2010. Exceptionalism and the politics of counter-terrorism: liberty, security and the war
on terror. Abingdon: Routledge.
Neal, A.W., 2012a. Normalization and legislative exceptionalism: counterterrorist lawmaking and
the changing times of security emergencies. International Political Sociology, 6 (3).
Neal, A.W., 2012b. Terrorism, lawmaking and democratic politics: legislators as security actors.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 24 (3).
Neocleous, M., 2008. Critique of security. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Palonen, K., 2006. Two concepts of politics: conceptual history and present controversies.
Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 7 (1), 11–25.
Prozorov, S., 2005. X/Xs: toward a general theory of the exception. Alternatives: Global, Local,
Political, 30, 81–112.
Richter-Montpetit, M., 2007. Empire, desire and violence: a queer transnational feminist reading of
the prisoner ‘abuse’ in Abu Ghraib and the question of ‘gender equality’. International Feminist
Journal of Politics, 9, 38–59.
Salter, M.B., 2008a. Imagining numbers: risk, quantification, and aviation security. Security
Dialogue, 39 (2–3), 243–266.
Salter, M.B., 2008b. Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian
air transport security authority. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11 (4),
321–349.
Scheuerman, W.E., 2006. Survey article: emergency powers and the rule of law after 9/11. Journal
of Political Philosophy, 14 (1), 61–84.
Schmitt, C., 1985. Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. Translated by G.
Schwab. London: MIT Press.
Stritzel, H., 2007. Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond. European Journal of
International Relations, 13 (3), 357–383.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
, [
An
dr
ew
 N
ea
l] 
at 
09
:14
 13
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
120 A.W. Neal
Tierney, S., 2005. Determining the state of exception: what role for parliament and the courts? The
Modern Law Review, 68 (4), 668–673.
Vasquez, J.A., 1993. The war puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vaughan-Williams, N., 2007. The shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes: new border politics?
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 32 (2), 177–195.
Wæver, O., 1995. Securitization and desecuritization. In: R.D. Lipschutz, ed. On security. New York:
Columbia University Press, 46–86.
Wæver, O., 2000. The EU as a security actor: reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-
sovereign security orders. In: M.C. Williams and M. Kelstrup, eds. International relations theory
and the politics of European integration: power, security, and community. London: Routledge,
250–294.
Waltz, K.N., 1979. Theory of international politics. London: McGraw-Hill.
Weber, M., 1994. The profession and vocation of politics. In: P. Lassman and R. Speirs, eds. Weber:
political writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 309–369.
Williams, M.C., 2003. Words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics.
International Studies Quarterly, 47, 511–531.
Wolfers, A., 1952. ‘“National security” as an ambiguous symbol’. Political Science Quarterly,
67 (4), 481–502.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
, [
An
dr
ew
 N
ea
l] 
at 
09
:14
 13
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
